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To be effective, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) must satisfy these six preconditions: (1)
they must be incorruptible; (2) they must be independent from the police and from political
control; (3) there must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation; (4) they must be
adequately staffed and funded; (5) they must enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially;
and (6) their governments must be committed to curbing corruption in their countries. This
article assesses the effectiveness of the ACAs in Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and
South Korea in terms of these preconditions. It concludes that the ACAs in Hong Kong and
Singapore are more effective than their counterparts in South Korea and Thailand because
of the political will of their governments, which is reflected in the provision of adequate
staff and budget to Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption and
Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, and the impartial enforcement of the
comprehensive anti-corruption laws in both city-states.
INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries, judging from their ranking and
scores on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). To combat
corruption these countries have relied on three patterns of corruption control. The first
pattern relies on the enactment of anti-corruption laws without a specific agency to enforce
these laws. For example in Mongolia, the Law on Anti-Corruption that was introduced in
April 1996 is jointly implemented by the police, the General Prosecutor’s Office, and the
Courts (Quah, 2003a, p. 44).1  The second pattern involves the implementation of anti-
corruption laws by several anti-corruption agencies. In India, the Prevention of Corruption
Act (POCA) is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Central
Vigilance Commission (CVC), and the anti-corruption bureaus and vigilance commissions
at the state level (Quah, 2003a, p. 66).    Similarly, the Philippines has relied on 18 anti-
corruption agencies to enforce the many anti-corruption laws since the Integrity Board was
? Revised version of paper presented at the Sixth Asian Forum on Public Management on “Comparative
Governance Reform in Asia: Democracy, Corruption, and Government Trust” organised by the Department of
Public Administration, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand, January 12-13, 2007.
1 Mongolia finally established an Anti-Corruption Agency in July 2006, eight years after the present author
had recommended its formation as part of the National Anti-Corruption Plan he presented to the Government
of Mongolia as the Lead Consultant for the United Nations Development Programme Mission to Ulaanbataar
in September and October 1998. See Quah (1998) and Quah (1999).
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formed by President Quirino in May 1950 (Batalla, 2001, p. 47; Oyamada, 2005, pp.99-
101).
The third pattern of corruption control was initiated by Singapore when it established the
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952 to implement the
Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO). Malaysia followed Singapore’s example by
forming the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) in October 1967 (Quah, 2003a, p. 17). Hong
Kong was the third country to adopt the third pattern in February 1974, when the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was created (Quah, 2003a, p. 140).
The success of the CPIB and ICAC in curbing corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong
respectively has popularized the third pattern among other Asian countries. The Counter
Corruption Commission (CCC) was set up in Thailand in February 1975 but was
ineffective and replaced by the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in
November 1999. The Korea Independent Commission Against Commission (KICAC) was
formed in South Korea in January 2002 (Quah, 2003a, pp. 17-18). Finally, Indonesia
adopted  the  third  pattern  when  the  Corruption  Eradication  Commission  (CEC)  was
established in December 2003 (Quah, 2006, p. 178).
However,  even  though the  third  pattern  of  corruption  control  is  popular  not  all  the  Asian
countries which have adopted this pattern have been effective in curbing corruption.
Indeed, Jeremy Pope (2000) has lamented that “unfortunately, Anti-Corruption Agencies
have been more often failures than successes” (p. 104). What are the preconditions for the
effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs)? This article compares the performance of
the  CPIB,  ICAC,  KICAC  and  NCCC  by  assessing  the  extent  to  which  these  four  ACAs
have met these six preconditions.2  Before proceeding to discuss these preconditions, it is
necessary to describe the mission and functions of the four ACAs.
MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF ACAs
ACAs are specialized agencies established by governments for the specific aim of
minimizing corruption in their countries. John R. Heilbrunn (2006) has identified four types
of ACAs:
1. The universal model, with its investigative, preventive, and
communicative functions, is typified by Hong Kong’s ICAC.
2. The investigative model is characterized by a small and centralized
investigative commission as operates in Singapore’s CPIB.
3. The parliamentary model includes commissions that report to
parliamentary committees and are independent from the executive and
judicial  branches  of  the  state  (for  example,  the  New  South  Wales
Independent Commission Against Corruption).
2 The ACA in Malaysia and CEC in Indonesia are excluded from this analysis because of the lack of
comparative data on these two ACAs.
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4. The multi-agency model includes  a  number  of  agencies  that  are
autonomous,  but  which  together  weave  a  web  of  agencies  to  fight
corruption. The United States Office of Government Ethics, with its
preventive approach, complements the Justice Department’s
investigative and prosecutorial powers, and together these
organizations make a concerted effort to reduce corruption (p. 136).
Singapore’s CPIB
Corruption was a serious problem in Singapore during the British colonial period. In 1871,
corruption was made an illegal offence with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits
Settlements of Malacca, Penang and Singapore. In 1879, a Commission of Inquiry into the
causes of inefficiency of the Straits Settlements Police Force found that corruption was
prevalent among the European inspectors and the Malay and Indian junior officers.
Similarly, another Commission of Inquiry into the extent of public gambling in the Straits
Settlements in 1886 confirmed the existence of systematic corruption in the police forces in
Singapore and Penang (Quah, 1979, pp. 24-26). An analysis of the 172 reported cases of
police corruption in Singapore during 1845-1921 found that bribery was the most common
form (63.4%), followed by direct criminal activities (24.4%), opportunistic theft (5.8%),
corruption of authority (5.2%), and protection of illegal activities (1.2%) (Quah, 1979, p.
24, Table 6).
However, the enactment of the POCO as the first anti-corruption law in Singapore, Malacca
and Penang on December 10, 1937 did not improve the situation.  On the contrary, the
problem of corruption deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation (February 1942 to
August 1945) because the rampant inflation made it difficult for civil servants to live on
their low wages. Trading in the black market was “a way of life” as “everyone was
surviving on some sort of black marketing.” Furthermore, “nepotism and corruption was
perfectly acceptable and everyone resorted to connections, friends and relatives” to get jobs
(Lee, 2005, p. 142).
The Japanese Occupation bred corruption as “bribery, blackmail and extortion grew out of
the violence and fear, the mechanisms with which the Japanese ruled their occupied
territories” (Lee, 2005, p. 205).  Indeed, according to Lee Gek Boi (2005):
Bribery worked wonders. From generals to the ordinary soldier, gifts and
money smoothed the way. Nothing was transparent and everything was
about  connections  and  payoffs.  Nothing  was  impossible  with  the  right
connections. … Shortages created the black market and a culture of
thievery to fuel the market. Everyone—the Japanese included—did black
marketing. The Japanese Occupation culture brought out the basic survival
instincts in people and produced a society where all manner of evils could
be justified because it was all about survival. … It would take years to
undo the corruption and address the social evils that Japanese military
occupation bred in Singapore (p. 205).
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Conditions worsened after the war and corruption spread among civil servants as a result of
their meagre salaries and inflation and their inadequate supervision by their superiors,
which provided them with many opportunities for corruption with a low probability of
being caught (Quah, 1982, pp. 161-162). In other words, corruption was a way of life for
many Singaporeans during the post-war period.
In 1950, the Commissioner of Police, J.P. Pennefather-Evans, reported that corruption was
rife in government departments. A few days later, the Chief of the Anti-Corruption Branch
(ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which was responsible for tackling
corruption, indicated that the problem of corruption had become worse. These reports on
the prevalence of corruption led to criticisms of the ACB’s ineffectiveness and the colonial
government’s “weak and feeble attempt” to fight corruption by Elizabeth Choy, a member
of the Second Legislative Council on February 20, 1952. She urged the colonial
government to take stronger measures to eradicate corruption by removing the ACB from
the police force and expanding its size, and by strengthening the POCO (Quah, 1978, p.
14).
The ACB was ineffective in curbing corruption for three reasons. First, it was a small
police  unit  consisting  of  17  men  who  were  given  a  difficult  task  to  perform  i.e.,  the
eradication of corruption in the police and other government departments. Second, as the
CID’s top priority was to deal with serious crimes like homicide, the task of fighting
corruption received lower priority and the ACB had to compete with the other branches for
limited manpower and resources (Quah, 2003a, p. 113).
The third and most important reason for the ACB’s ineffectiveness was the prevalence of
police corruption in colonial Singapore. In October 1951, a consignment of 1,800 pounds
of opium worth S$400,000 (US$133,333) was stolen by a gang of robbers, which included
three police detectives. A special team appointed by the British colonial government to
investigate the robbery found that there was widespread police corruption especially among
those policemen involved in protection rackets. This opium hijacking scandal made the
British colonial government realize the importance of creating an independent ACA that
would be separate from the police. Accordingly, it replaced the ACB with the CPIB in
October 1952 (Quah, 2003a, pp. 113-114).
The CPIB’s mission statement is: “To combat corruption through Swift and Sure, Firm but
Fair  Action”  (CPIB,  2004,  p.  ii).  To  fulfill  its  mission,  the  CPIB  performs  these  three
functions:
1. To receive and investigate complaints alleging corrupt practices;
2. To investigate malpractices and misconduct by public officers with an
undertone of corruption; and
3. To prevent corruption by examining the practices and procedures in the
public service to minimise opportunities for corrupt practices (CPIB,
2004, p. 3).
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The Corrupt Practices Investigation Programme is described in the national budget as the
administration  of  the  CPIB  and  “the  investigation  of  corruption  and  malpractices,  the
review of administrative weaknesses in the public sector that provides avenues for
corruption and the screening of officers for appointment in the public sector” (Republic of
Singapore, 1994, p. 638). Thus, in addition to the three functions mentioned above, the
CPIB also ensures that candidates selected for positions in the SCS and statutory boards in
Singapore are screened to ensure that only those candidates without any taint of corruption
or misconduct are actually recruited.
The  CPIB  comes  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office  (PMO)  and  is
divided into the Operations Division and the Administration and Specialist Support
Division.  As  the  CPIB’s  major  function  is  the  investigation  of  offences  under  the
Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), the Operations Division has four investigation units
including the Special Investigation Team, which handles the more difficult and major cases.
These four units are assisted by the Intelligence Department, which collects intelligence
and undertakes field research. The Administration Unit is responsible for administrative
and personnel matters, provides screening services to government departments and
statutory boards, and conducts strategic planning for the CPIB. The other three units in the
Administration and Specialist Support Division deal with prevention and review, computer
information system, and plans and projects (CPIB, 2004, pp. 3-4).
Hong Kong’s ICAC
Similarly, corruption was also a serious problem in Hong Kong during the British colonial
period. Leslie Palmier (1985) contended that corruption was already a way of life in Hong
Kong when the British acquired it in 1841 because
The Chinese who formed its population had long been accustomed to a
system where most of an official’s income depended on what he was able
to extort from the public. Not surprisingly, during the first decades of the
colony’s history corruption prospered at all levels of government (p. 123).
Bertrand de Speville (1997), a former ICAC Commissioner, has attributed the rampant
corruption in Hong Kong before the advent of the ICAC in 1974 to four reasons. First, the
rapid population growth after 1945 severely strained the social services, government
resources and manpower in Hong Kong and contributed to corruption as “everything was in
short supply.” Second, the Chinese immigrants to Hong Kong paid bribes to the police and
other civil servants to avoid being harassed by them. Third, the government’s monopoly
and regulations of various activities and the discretion of civil servants responsible for these
activities provided many opportunities for corruption. The final factor was the widespread
police corruption, which prevented the police from resolving the problem of corruption (pp.
13-14).
To cope with the increase in corruption after the Second World War, the British colonial
government enacted the POCO in 1948. It adopted the same method of corruption control
employed in Singapore in Hong Kong by forming the ACB as a special unit of the CID of
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the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF) to deal with the investigation and prosecution
of corruption cases (Kuan, 1981, p. 24). The ACB was separated from the CID in 1952 but
it still remained within the RHKPF. However, the ACB was not effective as its prosecution
of corruption offences resulted in between two to 20 court convictions per year (Wong,
1981, p. 45).
The ACB initiated a review of the POCO in 1968 and sent a study team to Singapore and
Sri Lanka during the same year to examine how their anti-corruption laws worked in
practice. The study team was impressed with the independence of their ACAs and
attributed Singapore’s success in curbing corruption to the CPIB’s independence from the
police (Wong, 1981, p. 47). However, the RHKPF rejected the recommendation to separate
the ACB by upgrading it into an Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) in May 1971 (Wong, 1981,
pp. 47-48; Quah, 2003a, p. 138).
The ACO was given more manpower but its credibility was undermined on June 8, 1973,
when a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent Peter F. Godber, escaped to the United
Kingdom. Godber’s escape angered the public and the government reacted by appointing a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances contributing to his escape.
Consequently, the Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, was forced by public criticism to
accept the Blair Commission’s recommendation to establish an independent agency,
separate from the RHKPF, to fight corruption.
Accordingly, the ICAC was formed on February 15, 1974 “to root out corruption and to
restore public confidence in the Government” (Wong, 1981, p.45). More specifically, the
ICAC’s raison d’etre is to perform “a trinity of purpose comprising investigation,
prevention and education.” Indeed, the ICAC’s “three-pronged approach” is critical for
developing “a new public consciousness” and is reflected in its organizational structure of
the three Departments of Operations, Corruption Prevention, and Community Relations
(ICAC, 1989, pp. 28-29).
Thailand’s NCCC
Corruption remains a serious problem in Thailand and its origins can be traced to the
Ayudhya period in the second half of the 14th century. Corruption became a national
problem after the Second World War and the first anti-corruption law (“An Act Specifying
Proceedings Against Public Servants and Municipal Officials Who Conduct Malfeasance or
Lack Ability”) was enacted in 1945 (Preecha, 2001, p. 105).
The first ACA in Thailand was formed in September 1972 with the establishment of the
Board of Inspection and Follow-up of Government Operations (BIFGO). Consisting of five
members, the BIFGO’s role was to investigate allegations of corruption against government
agencies and officials. Unfortunately, the BIFO was ineffective as its members were found
guilty of corruption themselves. Consequently, the BIFGO was dissolved after the October
1973 Revolution (Quah, 1982, pp. 171-172).
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In May 1974, Prime Minister Sanya appointed an Anti-Corruption Committee (ACC) to
investigate charges of corruption against public officials and to report its findings to the
prime minister or minister in charge of the ministry concerned. As an investigatory agency,
the ACC did not have any quasi-judicial powers and has to rely on the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and the Court of Justice to take legal action against corrupt officials.
Apart from investigating corruption cases, the ACC prepared an anti-corruption draft bill to
supplement the inadequate Penal Code. The draft bill was approved by the Cabinet in
December 1974 and the Counter Corruption Act (CCA) was passed by the National
Assembly in February 1975 (Quah, 2003b, p. 253).
The ACC was transformed by the CCA into the CCC. However, the CCC was ineffective
for three reasons: it lacked the power to punish corrupt officials; the public perception
among Thais that corruption is acceptable and not against the national interest; and the
constant conflict between the Cabinet and senior civil servants (Quah, 2003b, p. 253). The
CCC was a “paper tiger” as it lacked the “direct authority to punish public officials” and it
could not take action against corrupt politicians as it only had “the power to investigate a
bureaucrat following a complaint” (Amara, 1992, p. 240).
The CCC’s ineffectiveness in curbing corruption during its 24-year existence led to its
dissolution and replacement by the NCCC in November 1999. To avoid the weaknesses
encountered by its predecessor, the NCCC’s jurisdiction was changed from the Office of
the Prime Minister to the Senate. Unlike its predecessor, the NCCC is not a toothless paper
tiger as it has been empowered to investigate corruption complaints against both civil
servants and politicians.
Section 19 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999) has described in
detail the various powers and duties of the NCCC (ONCCC, 2006a, pp. 10-11). The NCCC
performs three major functions. First, it is responsible for inspecting and verifying the
declaration  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  submitted  by  politicians  and  civil  servants.  Those
officials who do not declare their assets or make false declarations are reported to the
Constitutional  Court  by  the  NCCC.  Those  found  guilty  are  removed  from  their  positions
and barred from holding political office for five years.
The NCCC’s second function is to prevent corruption in three ways: (1) to make
recommendations on preventing corruption to the Cabinet and other government agencies;
(2) to enhance the integrity of the officials and public by organizing contests, meetings and
seminars on fighting corruption among the people and civil servants; and (3) to foster
cooperation among the public by conducting seminars on countering corruption in Bangkok
and the other provinces.
Thirdly, the NCCC is also empowered to suppress corruption by taking disciplinary action
against corrupt politicians and civil servants. More specifically, it investigates complaints
of corruption against politicians and civil servants and has the power to impeach them for
having “unusual wealth,” or for committing corruption, malfeasance, or abuse of power.
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South Korea’s KICAC
The origins of corruption in South Korea can be traced to the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910).
However, corruption only became a serious problem after the 16th century because of the
ineffective anti-corruption measures and the participation of the King’s relatives in politics
and public affairs led to nepotism and bureaucratic corruption (Quah, 2003a, p. 155). In
their  analysis  of  South  Korean  public  administration,  Jong  S.  Jun  and  Myung  S.  Park
(2001) contended that “deeply rooted corruption” was a major reason for the incapability of
Korean public administration and the 1997 financial crisis. They wrote:
Corruption is the cancer of Korean society, and it is found at every level of
Korean society, from top officials down to minor civil servants. …
Corruption at high-level is widespread, but scandals involving bureaucrats,
particularly those who collect taxes and enforce customs regulations, are
often reported in newspapers as well (pp. 8-9).
President Park Chung Hee assumed office in May 1961 and he initiated the fight against
corruption in South Korea in 1963 when he merged the Board of Audit and the
Commission  of  Inspection  to  form  the  Board  of  Audit  and  Inspection  (BAI)  to  act  as  a
direct check on the economic bureaucracy. In other words, the BAI was the first de facto
ACA in South Korea (Quah, 2003a, p. 161). More specifically, the BAI performs these
three functions:
to confirm the closing accounts of the state’s revenues and expenditures; to audit
the accounts of the central government agencies, provincial governments and
other local autonomous bodies, and government-invested organizations to ensure
proper and fair accounting; and to inspect the work done by government
agencies and the duties of public officials to improve the operation and quality of
government services (Quah, 2003a, p. 164).
After winning the December 1997 presidential election, President Kim Dae Jung assumed
office in February 1998 and showed his commitment to curb corruption by implementing a
comprehensive anti-corruption strategy consisting of six components. The first and most
important component was the formation of an Anti-Corruption Committee to coordinate the
anti-corruption programmes and activities, and the formulation of the Anti-Corruption Law
to provide protection for whistleblowers, to strengthen citizen watch and participation in
anti-corruption movements, and to reinforce detection and punishment for corrupt practices
(Quah, 2003a, p. 165).
Another important reform introduced by President Kim was the establishment of the
Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) in 1998 to make South Korea more business friendly
by eliminating unnecessary or irrational economic and social regulations that hindered
business activities or interfered with people’s lives. For example, to obtain a permit to build
a factory, a company had to prepare an average of 44 documents and wait for several
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months for approval. These excessive regulations encourage corruption as businessmen are
prepared to bribe the relevant officials to bypass the cumbersome and tedious procedures
for obtaining a factory permit (Kim, 1997, pp. 261-262). After its first year of operations,
the RRC abolished 5,226 or 48% of 11,125 administrative regulations (Quah, 2003a, p.
168).
In April 1999, the Seoul Metropolitan Government launched an “Online Procedure
Enhancement for Civil Applications (OPEN)” system to improve civil applications
covering 54 common procedures, which could be filed through the Internet.3 By May 2000,
the OPEN system had processed 28,000 cases of civil applications and more than 648,000
persons had visited its website. Thus, the OPEN system has improved “customer-oriented
delivery of public services” and “transparency of city administration” as those officials
responsible for permit or approval procedures (usually perceived to be corruption-prone)
are “required to upload their work reports and documents to the Internet” to enable citizens
to monitor the progress of their applications (Moon, 2001, p. 41).
As President Kim’s strategy met with stiff resistance, it took more than two years before the
Anti-Corruption Act was passed on July 24, 2001. Six months later, the KICAC was
formed on January 25, 2002 as the de jure ACA in South Korea (Quah, 2003a, p. 169).
Chapter 2, Articles 10-24 of the Anti-Corruption Act (2001) specify the creation, functions
and composition of the KICAC (pp. 7-16).  The original eight functions of the KICAC were
specified in Article 11 (Anti-Corruption Act, 2001, pp. 7-8). However, in its Annual Report
2005, the KICAC (2006) has identified its major functions as:
1. Policy-maker: to formulate and coordinate anti-corruption policies by
organizing on a regular basis the Inter-Agency Meeting on Corruption.
2. Evaluator: to evaluate the levels of integrity and anti-corruption
practices of public-sector organizations.
3. Observer: to monitor corruption and protect whistle-blowers by
handling reports on alleged corrupt conduct and protecting and offering
rewards for whistle-blowers.
4. Partner:  to  promote  cooperation  for  the  fight  against  corruption  by
encouraging civil society involvement and public-private partnership
against corruption, and engaging in the global fight against corruption.
5. Legal-reformer: to improve the legal and institutional frameworks to
remove laws and practices which encourage corruption.
6. Ethics-leader: to inculcate ethical values in society by promoting public
awareness on the risks of corruption, and by enforcing the code of
conduct for public sector employees (pp. 4 and 7).
Unlike the CPIB, ICAC and NCCC, the KICAC cannot investigate corruption cases itself
as it has to rely on the BAI and other agencies to do so. Indeed, the KICAC’s inability to
investigate corruption cases is its Achilles heel. The second limitation of the KICAC is that
3 For more details on the OPEN system, see http://open.metro.seoul.kr.
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it focuses only on public sector corruption and does not deal with private sector corruption,
such as the bribery of a banker or an auditor.
PRECONDITIONS FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ACA
1. The ACA must be incorruptible
The ACA must be incorruptible for two reasons. First, if the ACA’s personnel are corrupt,
its legitimacy and public image will be undermined as its officers have broken the law by
being corrupt themselves when they are required to enforce the law. Second, corruption
among the ACA’s staff not only discredits the agency but also prevents them from
performing their duties impartially and effectively (Quah, 2000, p. 111). As indicated
earlier, BIFGO, Thailand’s first ACA, was dissolved after one year because it five members
were found guilty of corruption. More recently, the NCCC’s efforts in combating
corruption in Thailand suffered a setback when its nine commissioners resigned in May
2005. They were found guilty by the Supreme Court of Thailand of abusing their powers in
August 2004, when they issued an executive decree to increase their monthly salaries by
45,000 baht (US$1,125). However, this episode also shows that the NCCC members are not
above the law and are accountable for the abuse of their powers (Quah, 2007, p. 14).
To ensure its integrity, the ACA must be staffed by honest and competent personnel.
Overstaffing should be avoided and any staff member found guilty of corruption must be
punished and dismissed. Details of the punishment of corrupt staff must be widely
publicized in the mass media to serve as a deterrent to others, and to demonstrate the
ACA’s integrity and credibility to the public (Quah, 2000, pp. 113-114). For example, after
a senior CPIB officer was caught cheating a businessman in Singapore in 1997, the CPIB
director, Chua Cher Yak, ordered polygraph tests for all his staff, including himself, to
demonstrate their integrity. Indeed, the CPIB’s reputation remained untainted as Chua and
his staff passed the polygraph tests (Fong, 2005, p. H7).
2. The ACA must be independent from the police and from political control
As discussed above, the experiences of Singapore and Hong Kong in fighting corruption
clearly show the importance of not allowing the police to be responsible for corruption
control especially when the police was corrupt. In other words, the police was the biggest
obstacle to curbing corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong before the establishment of the
CPIB in October 1952 and the ICAC in February 1974 because of the prevalence of police
corruption in both city-states.
Accordingly,  the  success  of  the  CPIB  and  ICAC  in  combating  corruption  has  confirmed
that the first best practice in curbing corruption is: do not let the police handle the task of
controlling corruption as this would be like giving candy to a child and expecting him or
her not to eat it (Quah, 2004, p. 1). Singapore has taken 15 years (1937-1952) while Hong
Kong has taken 26 years (1948-1974) to learn this important lesson. Unfortunately, many
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Asian countries (India, Japan and Mongolia) have still not learnt this lesson yet as they
continue to rely on the police to curb corruption.
Apart from independence from the police, the ACA must also be independent from control
by the political leaders in two respects. First, the political leaders must not interfere in the
daily operations of the ACA. Second and more importantly, the ACA must be able to
investigate all political leaders and senior civil servants without fear or favour.
In Singapore, when the CPIB was formed in October 1952, it came under the jurisdiction of
the attorney-general. From 1959-1962, the CPIB was under the purview of the Ministry of
Home Affairs. The CPIB was under the jurisdiction of the PMO from 1963-1965 and under
the purview of the attorney-general again from 1965-1968. However, since 1969, the CPIB
has been under the PMO’s purview (CPIB, 2003, p. 16.109).
As the CPIB’s Director reports to the prime minister in Singapore, policy-makers who are
interested in adopting the CPIB model are concerned with the CPIB’s independence and the
possibility that the prime minister or president can use the CPIB-style agency against the
opposition political parties.4 Indeed, the “alacrity in pursuing corruption allegations against
[Deputy Prime Minister] Anwar Ibrahim” by Malaysia’s ACA in 1998 indicates that the
ACA,  which  comes  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  Department,  is  not
independent (RIAP, 2001, p. 131).
How independent is the CPIB? There are two committees which review the CPIB’s
activities.  In  1973,  the  Anti-Corruption  Advisory  Committee  (ACAC) was  formed on  the
prime minister’s advice to enhance its efforts to curb corruption in the Singapore Civil
Service (SCS). The ACAC was chaired by the Head of the SCS and included all the
permanent secretaries as its members. The ACAC was dissolved in 1975 but it was revived
in 1996 on the recommendation of the Anti-Corruption Review Committee (ACRC) to
review the CPIB’s investigative and preventive measures. The ACRC was established in
1996 to review Singapore’s anti-corruption measures. Like the ACAC, it consists of senior
civil servants and is chaired by the Head of the SCS (Tan, 1999, p. 61; and CPIB, 2003, p.
8.71).
As the CPIB has been under the PMO’s purview since 1969, it has investigated all
allegations of political corruption in Singapore as the incumbent government is committed
to minimizing corruption. Indeed, the CPIB has not hesitated to investigate allegations of
corruption against political leaders and senior civil servants in Singapore. In his speech to
Parliament on March 30, 1993, then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong declared:
4 These questions were posed to me by some Mongolian policy-makers during my visit to Ulaanbataar in
October 1998 as the lead consultant for the UNDP mission to Mongolia.
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I have every intention to make sure that Singapore remains corruption free.
… And everybody should know that corruption in any form will not be
tolerated. I expect all Ministers, all MPs and all public officers to set good
examples for others to follow. … If there is any allegation against any MP
[Member of Parliament] or Minister of assets wrongfully gained or
corruptly gained, the CPIB will investigate. If the MP concerned is unable
to explain how he had acquired these assets, or why he had not declared
them, he will be charged for corruption (Quoted in CPIB, 2003, p. 2.17,
emphasis added).
The introduction of the elected president in 1991 has enhanced the CPIB’s independence as
article 22G of the Constitution of Singapore empowers the CPIB’s director to continue his
investigations of ministers and senior civil servants even if he does not have the prime
minister’s consent to do so if he obtains the consent of the elected president (Thio, 1997, p.
114). Lee Hsien Loong, who was then deputy prime minister, referred to this check on the
prime minister in his speech to Parliament on March 13, 2003:
…  the  Prime  Minister  is  responsible  for  the  integrity  of  the  whole  civil
service, the public sector, as well as the Judges and the Ministers. It is his
responsibility to keep the system clean. If he does not, and we have a
corrupt Prime Minister, then we are in serious trouble. We have
safeguarded that situation, because under the Constitution if the Prime
Minister would not give leave to the CPIB to pursue a case, the CPIB can
go to the President, and the President can give leave to proceed. So, even
the Prime Minister can be investigated (Quoted in CPIB, 2003, p. 2.16,
emphasis added)
In short, while the CPIB’s director can obtain the consent of the elected president to
investigate allegations of corruption against ministers, MPs and senior civil servants if the
prime minister withholds his consent, the fact remains that the CPIB is not immune from
the prime minister’s influence and control as it comes under his jurisdiction. While the PAP
government has remained committed to minimizing corruption and has not used the CPIB
as a weapon against opposition political leaders during the past 48 years, the CPIB’s lack of
complete independence from the PMO makes it an unattractive model for those Asian
countries which are concerned about the possibility of their political leaders using a CPIB-
style agency against their political foes. In other words, the concern is whether the political
leaders in other Asian countries will resist the temptation of employing the CPIB-style
agency against their political rivals.
Unlike the ACAC and ACRC in Singapore, the ICAC in Hong Kong relies on these four
committees made up of citizens appointed by the Chief Executive after July 1997 to
scrutinize its activities:
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1. The Advisory Committee on Corruption reviews the ICAC’s overall
policy and reviews the work of the three departments and the
Administration Branch.
2. The Operations Review Committee reviews the work of the Operations
Department.
3. The Corruption Prevention Advisory Committee reviews the work of
the Corruption Prevention Department.
4. The Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations reviews
the work of the Community Relations Department.
However, as the ICAC Commissioner reports directly to the Chief Executive, the ICAC is
not completely free from political control. While the Chief Executive does not interfere in
the  ICAC’s  daily  operations,  it  would  be  difficult  for  the  Commissioner  to  initiate
investigation into allegations of corruption against the Chief Executive.
In Thailand, the CCC was not independent as it came under the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Prime Minister (OPM). Accordingly, to enhance the NCCC’s independence from the
OPM, several measures were introduced by the 1997 People’s Constitution, which was
designed to minimize the problem of corruption and to enhance political participation. The
nine members of the NCCC are appointed by the King on the recommendation of a 15-
member selection panel (consisting of three judges, seven academics, and five political
party representatives) for a single non-renewable term of nine years. The NCCC reports to
the Senate instead of the Prime Minister and can “freely conduct investigations in cases of
unusual wealth or corruption, including verification of public figures’ asset and liability
declarations” (Borwornsak, 2001, pp. 188-189).
According to section 58 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption (1999), the Senate has
the power to initiate the removal of persons in high-ranking positions if they are found
guilty of corruption, malfeasance in office, malfeasance in judicial office, or intentionally
exercising power contrary to the Constitution or the law (ONCCC, 2006a, p. 23). However,
the  control  of  the  Senate  by  the Thai Rak Thai party during Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra’s term of office meant in practice that the NCCC was not free from political
control.
In spite of its resource constraints, the NCCC has done a creditable job as it has
investigated corruption cases involving politicians and senior bureaucrats. In December
2000, the NCCC charged Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra with concealing assets worth
4.5 billion baht, accusing him of registering these assets in the names of his employees.
Thaksin was later acquitted by the Constitutional Court in an 8 to 7 split decision (Quah,
2007, p. 13).
In addition to strengthening the NCCC, the 1997 People’s Constitution was also concerned
with reducing potential conflicts of interest for public officials. It prohibited cabinet
members from holding partnerships, owning shares of more than 5% in business companies
and participating in commercial transactions with state agencies. However, critics of
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Thaksin accused him of “policy corruption” by formulating policies and implementing
projects that favoured himself and his cabinet colleagues (Quah, 2007, pp. 13-14).
Prime Minister Thaksin’s government was overhrown in a bloodless military coup on
September 19, 2006. The 1997 Constitution was suspended and martial law was introduced
by  the  Council  for  Democratic  Reform  (CDR)  led  by  army  chief,  General  Sonthi
Boonyaratkalin. If the coup had not occurred, it was likely that Thaksin and his Thai Rak
Thai party would have won the October 2006 general election. This would have resulted in
a continuation of Thaksin’s rule and the policy corruption that grew during his term of
office. If the CDR keeps its promise of holding elections after formulating a new
constitution within a year after the coup, there is hope that the situation in Thailand might
improve (Quah, 2007, p. 14).
3. There must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation
Comprehensive anti-corruption legislation is an important prerequisite for combating
corruption effectively. More specifically, the anti-corruption laws in a country must (1)
define explicitly the meaning of corruption and its different forms; and (2) specify clearly
the powers of the director and/or members of the ACA. For example, the Prevention of
Corruption Act (POCA) of 1960, defines “gratification” and identifies the CPIB’s director
in section 2. Furthermore, sections 15-20 provide details of the powers of the CPIB’s
director and his officers (Quah, 1978, pp. 11-12).
Similarly, section 12 of the ICAC Ordinance 1974 describes the Commissioner’s duties as
the investigation and prevention of corruption including the “education of the public against
the evils of corruption and the enlisting and fostering of public support in combating it”
(Quoted in Lethbridge, 1985, p. 104). The ICAC Ordinance also enables the director of the
Operations Department to authorize his officers to restrict the movement of a suspect, to
examine bank accounts and safe deposit boxes, to restrict disposal of a suspect’s property
and to require a suspect to provide full details of his financial situation (Quah, 2003a, p.
143).
The Organic Act on Counter Corruption (1999) defines “corruption” and other terms in
section 4. Section 7 describes how the nine commissioners of the NCCC are selected and
sections 19-31 specify their powers and duties (ONCCC, 2006a, pp. 3-5 and 10-14). In the
same way, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 defines the “act of corruption” and other terms
in  article  2.  Chapter  2  is  devoted  to  the  formation,  functions  and  composition  of  the
KICAC. Finally, an innovative feature of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 is its focus on
whistle-blowing, which is described in articles 25-39 in Chapter 3 (pp. 2-3, and 7-30).
Apart from being comprehensive, the anti-corruption laws must be reviewed periodically to
remove loopholes or deal with unanticipated problems by introducing amendments or, if
necessary, new legislation. For example, Singapore’s POCA was amended in 1966 to
ensure that Singapore citizens working for their government in embassies and other
government agencies abroad would be prosecuted for corrupt offences committed outside
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Singapore and would be dealt with as if such offences had occurred in Singapore (section
35) (Quah, 1978, p. 13).
4. The ACA must have adequate staff and funding
As fighting corruption is expensive in terms of skilled manpower, equipment, and financial
resources, the incumbent government must demonstrate its political will and support by
providing the required personnel and budget needs of the ACA.
Table 1 below shows that in terms of personnel,  the ICAC is the largest  ACA with 1,194
members, followed by the NCCC (701 members), the KICAC (205 members) and the CPIB
(82 members). Similarly, the ICAC ranks first with its hugh budget of US$85 million and
per capita expenditure of US$12.32. The CPIB is fourth with its budget of US$7.7 million
and second in terms of its per capita expenditure of US$1.71. The KICAC has the second
largest budget of US$17.8 million but it ranks third with its per capita expenditure of
US$0.37. Finally, the NCCC has the third lowest budget of US$8.55 million and the lowest
per capita expenditure of US$0.13.
Table 1. Comparative Analysis of Personnel and Budget of Four ACAs, 2004-2005
Item CPIB ICAC NCCC KICAC
Personnel 82 1,194 701 205
Budget US$7.7 m US$85 m US$8.55 m US$17.8 m
Population 4.5 m 6.9 m 63.5 m 48.0 m
Per capita
expenditure
US$1.71 US$12.32 US$0.13 US$0.37
Sources: The 2005 data for CPIB, ICAC and KICAC are compiled from Republic of
Singapore, 2007, pp. 371-372; ICAC, 2006, p. 28; KICAC, 2006, p. 6.  The 2004 data for
the NCCC are compiled from the ONCCC, 2006b, pp. 85 and 87.
In his analysis of the NCCC’s staffing situation in 1999, when it took over from the CCC,
Borwornsak (2001) lamented that the NCCC did not have enough staff to handle its heavy
workload of investigating “5,741 asset and liability declarations of politicians and high-
ranking officials; 530 accusations launched against holders of public office; 1,967 cases of
corruption transferred from the now defunct CCMC [or CCC]; 19 criminal cases transferred
from investigation and prosecution police in the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for
Persons Holding Political Positions; 73 cases of unusual wealth; and 48 urgent cases”
(p.199). Referring to the NCCC’s plight in 2001, Borwornsak warned that:
Staff and funding are critical factors in agency performance because
control agencies cannot operate effectively without qualified personnel and
adequate resources. … Without adequate funding for new staff and an
appropriate pay scale, it is difficult to imagine how the NCCC is to operate
effectively. If the situation is not improved the NCCC risks being labeled a
“paper tiger”—an appellation often assigned to the CCMC [or CCC]. In
such  a  case  the  blame  rests  squarely  on  the  shoulders  of  the  government
(pp. 198-199).
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In sum, Table 1 above demonstrates clearly that Hong Kong’s ICAC and Singapore’s CPIB
are well-funded and have adequate staff for performing their functions effectively. On the
other hand, South Korea’s KICAC and Thailand’s NCCC are inadequately staffed and
funded as manifested in their extremely low per capita expenditure of US$0.37 and
US$0.13 respectively.
5. The ACA must enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially.
The anti-corruption laws must be impartially enforced by the ACA. The ACA’s credibility
will be undermined if it devotes it efforts to petty corruption by convicting “small fish”, and
ignores grand corruption by the rich and powerful in the country. If the “big fish” are
protected and not prosecuted, the ACA is ineffective and will probably be used by the
political leaders against their political rivals.
Singapore’s CPIB has “enhanced its credibility by pursuing allegations of corruption at the
highest levels of government” (Tan, 1999, p. 64). In 1975, a Minister of State, Wee Toon
Boon, was found guilty of accepting bribes from a property developer and was sentenced to
four and a half years of imprisonment. In 1979, a MP and prominent trade unionist, Phey
Yew Kok, was convicted of criminal breach of trust and other offences, but he jumped bail
and fled to another country. In 1986, Teh Cheang Wan, the Minister for National
Development, was investigated for accepting bribes from two property developers.
However, he committed suicide before he could be charged in court. In 1991, the Director
of the Commercial Affairs Department, Glenn Knight, was jailed and fined after being
charged in court for corruption and cheating. In 1993, Yeo Seng Teck, the Chief Executive
Officer of the Trade Development Board, was sentenced to four year’s jail for corruption,
cheating and forgery. Finally, in 1995, the Deputy Chief Executive of the Public Utilities
Board (PUB), Choy Hon Tim, was charged for accepting bribes from PUB contractors and
sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment (Tan, 1999, pp. 64-65).
Similarly, Hong Kong’s ICAC has earned the public’s confidence by ensuring that all
reports of corruption, no matter how small, are investigated (Quah, 2003a, p. 144). As
corruption is viewed as a “high risk, low reward” activity in Hong Kong, it is not surprising
that Robert P. Beschel Jr. (1999) found that a person committing a corrupt offence in Hong
Kong  was 35 times more likely to be detected and punished than his counterpart in the
Philippines (p. 8).
In May 1997, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the
Australian Parliament voiced its concern about corruption in Hong Kong after the handover
to China in July 1997 when it stated that “the corruption, rampant in China, if extended to
Hong Kong, could prove disastrous for the territory” (p. 98). This concern was not original
as it had been expressed earlier by Emily Lau in 1988, and Michael Yahuda in 1996 when
he referred to the “pervasive fear” of the “seepage of corruption” from mainland China to
Hong Kong after July 2007 (Lau, 1988, p. 29; Yahuda, 1996, pp. 128-129).
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In 2001, the then Commissioner of the ICAC, Alan N. Lai, referred to the “considerable
trepidation in the community concerning Hong Kong’s ability to preserve its essentially
corruption-free culture” and posed these two questions:
Would  the  SAR  Government  have  the  will  and  determination  to  fight
graft? Now that the territory had reintegrated with mainland China, would
the irregular practices so common across the border spill over to Hong
Kong? (p. 51)
His answers to these two questions were “Yes” and “No” respectively:
Four years have passed since the 1997 sovereignty change and today, Hong
Kong can say with pride that her credentials as a champion in fighting graft
have remained as strong as ever. The ICAC continues to tackle the corrupt
without fear or favour, and our track record of catching not only small
flies, but also big tigers remains unblemished. Since July 1997, ICAC
activities have regularly hit the headlines. … Once known to the ICAC, no
one can escape our scrutiny (Lai, 2001, pp. 51-52).
In sum, there must be impartial and not selective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws
by the ACA.
6. Political will is crucial for minimising corruption
Political will is perhaps the most important precondition for the effectiveness of an ACA.
The political leaders in a country must be sincerely committed to the eradication of
corruption by showing exemplary conduct and adopting a modest lifestyle themselves. This
means that those found guilty of corruption must be punished, regardless of their status or
position in society. Political will is absent when the “big fish” or rich and famous are
protected from prosecution for grand corruption, and only the “small fish” or ordinary
people are caught and punished for petty corruption.
Political will refers to the commitment of political leaders to eradicate corruption and exists
when these three conditions are met: (1) comprehensive anti-corruption legislation exists;
(2) the independent ACA is provided with sufficient personnel and resources; and (3) the
anti-corruption laws are fairly enforced by the independent ACA (Quah, 2004, p. 4).
Indeed, political will is “the most important prerequisite as a comprehensive anti-corruption
strategy will fail if it is not supported by the political leadership in a country” (Quah,
2003a, p. 181). Thus, the commitment of the political leaders in fighting corruption ensures
the allocation of adequate personnel and resources to the anti-corruption effort, and the
impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the ACA.
In 1985, the then prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, argued that political leaders
should be paid the top salaries that they deserved to ensure honest government. If ministers
and senior civil servants were underpaid, they would succumb to temptation and indulge in
corruption (Quah, 1989, p. 848). However, the plausibility of this argument is debatable as
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Singapore had initiated its anti-corruption strategy in 1960 with the reduction of
opportunities for corruption by strengthening the POCA and the CPIB, since the
government could not afford to reduce the incentive for corruption through raising salaries
until after 1972 (Quah, 2003c, p. 157).
In the final analysis, an ACA in a country is only as effective as its incumbent government
wants  it  to  be.  In  other  words,  an  ACA  can  only  be  effective  if  it  is  supported  by  a
government  that  is  committed  to  eradicating  corruption  in  the  country.  The  former  CPIB
Director, Chua Cher Yak, alluded to this in November 2002:
It is far easier to have a good, clean government administering a good,
clean system than it is for a good anti-corruption agency to clean up a
corrupt government and a crooked system. In the latter case, the result is
almost predictable: the anti-corruption agency is likely to come off second
best. Clearly most governments will possess enough fire power to
overwhelm even the most intense, well-meaning anti-corruption agency (p.
3).
CONCLUSION
In its comparative study on the institutional arrangements employed by 14 countries to
combat corruption, the UNDP Regional Centre (2005) in Bangkok concluded that there
were more advantages than disadvantages in relying on ACAs to curb corruption. While the
third pattern of relying on an independent ACA is popular in many Asian countries, its
adoption does not automatically result in success without political will or a favourable
policy context.
If political will exists and the country has a favourable policy context, the best method for
curbing corruption is to establish an ACA and equip it with adequate powers, personnel and
funding. The examples of Hong Kong and Singapore show that, “apart from political will,
they have succeeded in curbing corruption because of their favourable policy contexts: they
have small populations; stable governments; high standards of living; efficient civil service
systems; and well developed infrastructure” (Quah, 2004, p. 4). On the other hand, apart
from being less committed to fighting corruption, the governments of Thailand and South
Korea  have  also  a  less  favourable  policy  context  as  they  are  larger  countries  with  more
population, less efficient civil services and lower standards of living. The fact that the
KICAC  cannot  investigate  corruption  reports  is  a  reflection  of  a  lack  of  political  will  in
curbing corruption in South Korea. Hence, it is not surprising that Table 2 below shows that
both Singapore and Hong Kong have higher scores on the 2006 CPI and World Bank
indicator on the control of corruption than South Korea and Thailand.
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Table 2. CPI Ranking and Score and Control of Corruption Percentile Rank for Four
Asian Countries in 2006
Country CPI Ranking and Score Control of Corruption
Percentile Rank
Singapore 5th (9.4) 98.1
Hong Kong 15th (8.3) 92.7
South Korea 42nd (5.1) 64.6
Thailand 63rd (3.6) 50.5
No. of Countries 163 212
Sources: http://www.transparency.org for  the  2006  CPI  ranking  and  score;  and
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp for the 2006 data on the World
Bank’s sixth indicator on the control of corruption
However, if there is no political will to curb corruption, the danger exists that the political
leaders  in  a  country  can  use  the  ACA as  a  weapon against  their  political  enemies.  There
must be checks to prevent this from happening if a country decides to establish an
independent ACA to curb corruption.
Thus, in spite of their popularity, care should be taken by political leaders before adopting
independent ACAs to curb corruption. Richard Rose (2005) has advised that a policy lesson
can only be applied if three prerequisites are met:
Even if a lesson appears desirable and the pressure of events creates a
demand for political action, this does not guarantee that you can apply it at
home. For this to happen, there must be space to introduce a new
programme into an already crowded set of government commitments; there
must be the resources to implement it; and there must not be crosscultural
misunderstandings that lead to a mismatch between what a lesson requires
and  the  beliefs  and  practices  of  the  government  adopting  it.  Only  if  all
three conditions are met can you hope to apply a lesson in practice (p.
116).
Finally, in view of the contextual differences between Singapore and Hong Kong and the
other Asian countries, and the absence of political will, it is unlikely that these countries
can successfully transplant the CPIB or ICAC model. Indeed, as Michael Johnston (1999)
has rightly cautioned: “ICACs [Independent Commissions Against Corruption] are unlikely
to be right for every country” (p. 225). In other words, the CPIB and ICAC and their
favourable policy contexts have enabled Singapore and Hong Kong to curb corruption
effectively. Political leaders in Asian countries who wish to curb corruption must
demonstrate their political will by allocating the required resources and legislation for the
CPIB or ICAC-style agency to perform its task of impartially enforcing the comprehensive
anti-corruption laws.
Jon S.T. Quah was Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore
until his retirement in June 2007, after 35 years of service. Email: jonstquah@gmail.com
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